Behind the 'Surge'

If you're reading this blog, you're probably familiar with the recent history of the Iraq war -- the turning of the Sunni tribes, the changes in U.S. strategy, the arming of the neighborhood militias, he deployment of extra American troops, the power moves by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. But even if you know all about these broad strokes, two articles out this week provide vivid details.

First up is Steve Coll's masterul tick-tock on how the so-called "Surge" was decided -- and executed. In the New Yorker article, General Petraeus comes out looking smart, flexible, and tough. But he isn't the solitary Einstein of the Euphrates that other hagiographic profiles have made him out to be. He also benefited from some extremely fortituous decision-making in Anbar province, in Baghdad, and in Washington.

The Joint Chiefs’ 2006 study group on Iraq strategy, under Pace, became known as the Council of Colonels—it was made up of just over a dozen officers selected because of their Iraq combat experience or their reputations as strategic thinkers… Any new deployment to Iraq “was going to add additional strain to the armed forces of the United States,” Pace told me. “The math was the math…”

Bush, however, had invested his Presidency in the Iraq war… Bush declared that there were few things he cared about more than the health of the United States military, but losing in Iraq was one of them…

*In early October, at the instigation of Stephen Hadley, Bush’s national-security adviser, William Luti, a retired U.S. Navy captain who served as a senior director on the N.S.C. for defense policy and strategy, produced a PowerPoint briefing, “Changing the Dynamics in
Iraq,” with a detailed subtitle: “Surge and Fight, Create Breathing
Space, and Then Accelerate the Transition to Iraqi Control…” *

Petraeus had played only a marginal role in the decision-making.
He appeared before Pace’s Council of Colonels and met with Cheney, outlining for the Vice-President his ideas about counter-insurgency.
Consulted by the White House during a last round of debate, the General also asked for a deployment of the greatest possible size.

Next is Bing West's piece in the National Review (subcription only), chronicling his 15th trip to Iraq since the war began. Again, Petraeus takes advantage of some unexpected luck:

*Then, in late March of 2008, he changed course yet again. In a bizarre episode, Maliki himself directed a sudden attack against the Mahdi Army, which was entrenched in the key southern city of Basra….

Maliki’s abrupt move against Sadr’s stronghold in Basra angered and surprised the Americans. The offensive faltered due to lack of preparation as well as command confusion: “The Iraqi operations center,” an American general told me, “consisted of Maliki with eight cell phones yelling at his generals in a separate building with four cell phones.” Rather than let the offensive fail or drag out, Petraeus sent special forces, electronic and surveillance intelligence assets, and air controllers to help the Iraqi battalions. With airborne video capturing the movement, day or night, of anyone stepping outside with a weapon, and attack helicopters waiting to pounce, the overmatched Mahdi
Army broke apart.*