Security

Shi'ite Fight Still a Mystery

There’s already been a lot of loose chatter, about the intra-Shi’ite fighting that went down in Basra recently — and continues in Baghdad. With Gen. Petraeus in Washington to testify on the state of the Iraq war, expect to hear even more talk. Some will say Iran backed the Shiiite firebrand Moktada al-Sadr; others will […]

C15de28cbc7c4419bb7da7eb2b8f0d1a_ms
There's already been a lot of loose chatter, about the intra-Shi'ite fighting that went down in Basra recently -- and continues in Baghdad. With Gen. Petraeus in Washington to testify on the state of the Iraq war, expect to hear even more talk. Some will say Iran backed the Shiiite firebrand Moktada al-Sadr; others will argue that Tehran was helping the Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki; some will claim Sadr lost; others will say insist that Maliki got the short end of the stick.

Ignore it all, an *extremely *well-placed observer counsels. "Look, I know as much about the Shi'a as any white man, and I still have no idea what went on there. None of us do. We just don't understand how their [internal] politics works."

Anthony Cordesman, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, has the same advice, basically:

*It is still far from clear why Maliki chose to act at this time and in the way he did in going on the offensive against Sadr and the Mahdi militia, and how his actions related to the complex power struggle emerging among Iraq's key Shi'ite factions. It is equally unclear why he stopped, why Sadr has so far shown so much seeming restraint, and how much of a role Iran played in the process. *

What is clear is that the intra-Shi'ite power struggle has only begun, will be violent to some degree, and is likely to intensify through the fall 2008 local/provincial elections, the 2009 national elections, and beyond. It is also clear that the US does not have a reliable Shi'ite partner in either Al Dawa (the Maliki faction) or the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq or ISCI (the Hakim/Badr Organization faction). It has even less ties to Fadila – the small party now dominating the Basra government.

  • All these Shiite factions are now virtually certain to continue to play the Iran card both to leverage the US and guard against US withdrawal.
    As for Dawa and ISCI, it is fine to talk about democracy, and the central government but the US needs to be far more careful about taking sides and possibly alienating large numbers of Shi’ites. *

The US cannot be sure that Dawa and ISCI will not attempt to manipulate any provincial/local elections that take place this year. At least ISCI
is certain to try to expand its local power base using its governors in the south and their ties to the police, and try to use the option of a nine province Shi'ite federation to carve out an enclave it can control even if this means further weakening national unity. At the same time, a weak Dawa and a stronger Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq also are potential competitors and may turn on each other... *

As a result, intra-Shi'ite political accommodation has become as much of an issue as sectarian and ethnic political accommodation. It is also a volatile issue, and one where Ambassador Crocker, General Petraeus, and everyone else, can only guess at the eventual outcome. *

ALSO: