Nuke Standards Slipping

Last year, a B-52 mistakenly loaded with nuclear weapons took a trip across the United States, sparking concerns about the safety of U.S. nuclear arsenal. The important question, however, is whether this incident was an isolated snafu, or indicative of deeper problems in the nuclear world. Some are arguing it is indeed the latter; safety standards and procedures in the nuclear world have been eroding for years,reports Air Force Times, the same newspaper that broke the original bent spear incident.

Four Air Force generals who testified about the Minot incident and nuclear security before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Feb. 12 said the service has lost its focus on the nuclear mission.

However, internal Air Force reports and safety records dating to 1992 show service officials received regular and consistent warnings about the erosion of nuclear safety standards. But there was no thorough examination of vulnerabilities until after the incident at Minot.

The intent of the late August mission was to fly a dozen Advanced Cruise Missiles from Minot to Barksdale to be decommissioned. But instead of loading two pylons, each containing six non-nuclear missiles, under the B-52’s wings Aug. 29, the 5th Bomb Wing airmen rolled out one pylon loaded with nuclear warheads and strapped it onto one of the wings.

All six warheads sat on runways for close to 36 hours — first at Minot and then at Barksdale — without the appropriate nuclear security until a 2nd Bomb Wing airman at Barksdale discovered the mistake Aug. 30.

Former Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Merrill McPeak warned 16 years ago when Air Combat Command took over the nuclear mission from Strategic Air Command “about the worsening practices regarding the safe handling and storage of nuclear weapons and directed commanders at every level to review surety programs,” according to a 2005 Natural Resources Defense Council report, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels and War Planning.”

That sentiment was echoed in the Air Force’s most recent reviews of its nuclear program.

The report referred to in the article was done by the Defense Science Board (the full report is available in PDFhere). The panel appears to place the blame on the declining role of nuclear weapons, relative to conventional ones:

“The decline is characterized by embedding nuclear mission forces in non-nuclear organizations, markedly reducing levels of leadership whose focus is the nuclear enterprise, and a general devaluation of the nuclear mission and those who perform the mission,” according to the report by the Defense Science Board task force led by Welch.

Interviews with B-52 crews showed they typically spend only 5 percent to 20 percent of their time on the nuclear mission. Air Force leaders understand that the conventional mission is still the primary role of most bomber units, but they stressed that airmen need to spend more time training.

“We need to look at our exercise and inspection programs,” Peyer said. “What you can’t get from practical experience you have to supplement through your training and your exercise program. We can’t go back to where we were in 1991. We don’t live in the same world.”

Ironically, the report suggests that last year's mishap could be a blessing in disguise if it prompts the Defense Department to get its act together and fix the underlying problems, before an ever bigger problem emerges.