Stopping -- and Coping -- with Nuclear Terror (Part 2)

Yesterday, Noah noted the* LA Times* story about our efforts to counter nuclear terrorism. He focused on the emergency response area. Today, I'll look at another angle to the story: nuclear forensics, "which aims to track nuclear materials to their country of origin."

Even if a bomb detonates, fallout can be analyzed to identify the terrorists and their state sponsors. A retaliatory strike could be the response.

The idea is to force other nations to take better care of their own nuclear fuels or else find themselves in the cross hairs of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

A major technical and policy analysis of this approach -- the report that is due next month -- is being conducted by some of the nation's top nuclear weapons experts, sponsored by the American Assn. for the Advancement of Science and led by Stanford University physicist Michael M. May.

The forensics study is trying to assess how authoritative the U.S.
could be in attributing a nuclear device to a particular source and in making its case to the American public and the rest of the world.

Davis said it was hoped that nuclear forensics could determine the size of a detonation within one hour; the sophistication of the bomb design within six hours; how the fuel was enriched within 72 hours; and the peculiar details of national design -- "Does this look like a Russian, a Chinese or a Pakistani device, or something we have never seen before?" -- within a week.

For a while, I have been concerned that our efforts at countering nuclear terrorism were, in effect, creating a nuclear Maginot Line. Defensive measures such as port security could be circumvented or bypassed by a determined smuggler. And the effort to widely distribute nuclear detection technology has been problematic. The key to any successful defense is depth, and nuclear forensics is a force multiplier.

The Cold War had mutually assured destruction, but in the post-Cold War "Second Nuclear Age," proliferation and instability take MAD out of the equation. A nuclear device could have its origins from anywhere, not just the USSR. A rogue regime or even a "super-empowered individual" such as AQ Khan might count on proliferation and loose control over nuclear materials to hide their tracks as they did the unthinkable. Nuclear forensics could theoretically take anonymity out of the equation.

Of course, there is no perfect defense against terrorism, but it is good to see we're adding deterrence to our tool box. The message is don't be stupid with your nuclear materials.

Meanwhile, my Danger-roomie Jason Sigger isn't convinced; we'll be keeping our eyes out for that report.