
Shortly before I left for the holidays, Congressional appropriators provided “no funds" for the Administration's program for new nuclear weapons, the so-called Reliable Replacement Warhead, or RRW. Congress wants to see “a new strategic nuclear deterrent mission assessment for the 21st century” before they give up any cash. That bottom line — no new warheads without a new posture — appears to command bipartisan support among the appropriators.
The RRW is, for all intents and purposes, dead.
National Nuclear Security Administrator Tom D’Agostino and company have to be asking themselves: Now what?
Our friend John Fleck points to one answer in the Albuquerque Journal, noting similarities between a 1990 paper and D’Agostino’s remarks on 18 December:
I created a text version of the Gold and Wagner paper because I can’t find it anyway on-line. (It probably has more than a couple of typos from the OCR recognition software — feel free to e-mail corrections.)
I really think this is the only argument that NNSA has going for nuclear weapons programs, including whatever stockpile work will come after RRW. I never got around to flagging the idea, even after Joe Martz made a pretty decent case to the San Francisco Chronicle‘s Jim Sterngold. Martz, speaking to Fleck, aptly argued, “My work becomes the deterrent, not so much the products of my work.”
I may just be a sucker for the “virtual swords” thing, having got my start in Washington working for Mike "Virtual Nuclear Arsenals" Mazarr. But it seems to me that, at some point, we need a bipartisan consensus on what the labs are supposed to do in post-arms race world. And that requires a vision of what it is that nuclear weapons do in that world.
Now, don’t get me wrong — a “virtual swords” concept should not
be an excuse to fund an infrastructure better sized to a nuclear weapons stockpile of 10,000 than 1,000 (see the Modern Pit Facility).
And my politics are not those of Gold and Wagner. But I can see how prudent investments in our defense industrial base, most importantly the people, can provide a hedge that enables deep reductions in our bloated nuclear stockpile that could safely number in the hundreds, rather than thousands, of weapons.
I would argue that NNSA
officials failed to secure Congressional support for a variety of multi-billion dollar initiatives — including funding for the Modern Pit
Facility, Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator and Reliable Replacement
Warhead — precisely because these programs were conceived, articulated and implemented as part of a stockpile that looks liked a smaller version of the Cold War stockpile, instead of a stockpile based on the reality that much of the deterrent benefit from our nuclear stockpile is existential in nature.
It seems to me that fact — that the deterrent benefit accrues through the weapons existence and is robust across disparities in the technical details — forms to core of my answer to Cheryl Rofer’s excellent challenge to bloggers to articulate a new nuclear posture.
Update: Joe Martz has some interesting comments at* LANL: The Rest of the Story*.
-- cross-posted at ArmsControlWonk.com
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