Congress Raps Pentagon on Bomb Resistant Vehicles

The Pentagon's rush to build Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles apparently isn't fast enough for members of Congress, who in a hearing yesterday questioned why it was taking so long to build the Humvee replacements, and expressed concern about the logistics of operating different models. AP reports:

At a hearing by the House Armed Services Committee, lawmakers said a Navy warfare center in Charleston, S.C., being used to install the radio jammers and communications systems on the mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles, called MRAPs, is not organized to do the work.

"It kind of reminded me of the middle of the night before Christmas assembling my kid's toys," said Rep. Gene Taylor, D-Miss., who recently visited the Charleston facility. "I'm still not convinced we're doing everything we can do."

Even though the 15,274 MRAPs to be built are needed to protect U.S. troops from the common threat of roadside bombs, each branch of the armed services has its own unique gear it wants installed, said Rep. Neil Abercrombie, D-Hawaii.

As defense contractors build greater numbers of vehicles, this variety of models further slows the integration process in Charleston, Abercrombie said, and creates support problems once the MRAPs are fielded.

John Young, the Defense Department's top acquisition official, defended the decision to use the Charleston facility, which is expected to handle 50 MRAP installations a day by mid-December.

According to Young, much of the gear being put into the MRAPs is very sensitive and requires specialized testing facilities the private-sector manufacturers don't have.

Young said he's pressed hard to make the MRAPs as uniform as possible.

"But at the end of the day I have to respect the senior military leaders' decision that says, 'Certain things have to be unique,'" Young said.

These problems are compounded by the Pentagon Inspector General's concerns expressed earlier this year that the Marine Corps' acquisition strategy was flawed:

*Although full and open competition may not have been an appropriate acquisition strategy given the unusual and compelling requirement for a mine resistant vehicle, MCSC officials should have considered other acquisition strategies such as limited competition or split procurement. MCSC officials might have identified other vendors capable of producing vehicles to help meet the unusual and compelling requirements in support of the Global War on Terrorism. *

It would be interesting to see Congress address the underlying issue: Why is Pentagon, which should be taking a longer-term view of the industrial base, so ill-equipped to surge production during war, be it on MRAPs, armor, or anything else.

Also:

* MRAPs vs. Superbombs
* Bomb-Fighting Vehicles Bite the Dust
* Bomb-Resistant Vehicles' Long Road to Acceptance
* Picture This: MRAP Menagerie
* Armor-Makers "Risked Soldiers' Lives," Says Pentagon I.G.
* Manufacturers Can't Fill Bomb-Proof Vehicle Demand
* Which Ride Takes Bomb-Blasts Best?
* Military Dragged Feet on Bomb-Proof Vehicles
* Bomb-Proof Vehicles: Why the Delay?
* Army Junking Future for New Rides?