Get out and walk – move mounted, work dismounted.
Vehicles like the up-armored HMMWV limit our situational awareness and insulate us from the Iraqi people we intend to secure. They also make us predicatble, often obliging us to move slowly on established routes. These vehicles offer protection, but they do so at the cost of a great deal of effectiveness… HMMWVs are necessary for traveling... But they are not squad cars. Stop by, don't drive by...
We are in a fight for intelligence – all the time.
Intelligence is not a “product” provided by higher headquarters, but something we gather ourselves through our own operations. Tactical reporting, from civilian and military agencies, is essential. There are thousands of eyes in your area -- all must acts as scouts...
Look beyond the IED – get the network that placed it.
Every IED provides a window into the network that placed it. If properly exploited, this window can be used to damage and “roll up” that network, ultimately defeating the threat. Units must look beyond the actual IED site to detect early-warning observation posts, firing and assembly points, and inflitration/exfiltration routes. Commanders should map IED patterns and use friendly convoy movement to trigger enemy action, having first pre-positioned SIGINT [signal intelligence] and reconnaissance assets to identify IED teams moving into position, and to listen for communications between OPs and firing teams. Lastly, use UAVs {unmanned aerial vehicles] to trace enemy firing teams back to caches and assembly areas...
Be first with the truth.
Since Soldier actions speak louder than what PAOs
[public affairs officers] say, we must be mindful of the impact our daily interactions with the
Iraqis have on global audiences via the news media. Commanders should communicate key messages down to the individual level, but, in general, leaders and Soldiers should be able to tell their stories unconstrained by overly prescriptive themes…
