It absolutely amazes me that, more than five years after 9/11, counterterrorism experts still don't understand the limitations of terrorist use of [Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear] hazards, and CBRN defense specialists still don't appreciate the motivations or agendas of terrorists, either with conventional weapons or CBRN hazards. Both sides myopically stare at the technical properties of the hazards and imagine large-scale use of military-scale NBC weapons rather than the much more available industrial hazards that are "disruptive" and not "destructive."
Hoffman has completely overplayed the threat of the chlorine VBIEDs. There's been maybe a dozen chlorine incidents, at least two of which didn't go off, and zero - ZERO - deaths caused by the chlorine gas. Although there have been hundreds of civilians exposed to the gas, resulting in hospitalizations, I don't think it's at all correct to say that these incidents have the Iraqi public "absolutely panicked." As a result, the effects are hardly "disproportionate" to other VBIEDs seen every week (like this one for instance).